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A.

INTRODUCTION

Legal scholars have devoted their energies to understanding the workings of
a wide variety of social institutions-governments, corporations, families-but
have rarely devoted comparable attention to the institutions in which they
work: law schools. As a career academic pressed into temporary service as an
Associate Dean, I was stimulated to consider how the insights about human
behavior developed to explain the workings of other institutions might be
applied to understand the administration of a law school.
Lobbying is ubiquitous in law schools. Students lobby for grades, for exam
conditions, for seats in popular courses. Faculty lobby for salary and for
attractive teaching loads. As I started my stint in administration, my intuition

• Mack Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. I would like to thank
Michael Herz, Melanie Leslie, and John McGinnis for helpful comments on an earlier draft.
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was that this lobbying generated little information that would improve the
quality of law school decisions. My surmise was that opportunities for
lobbying instead encouraged rent-seeking behavior.'
A year's work in administration did not shake my basic thesis. Indeed, my
first-hand experience left me somewhat surprised about just how ignorant I
previously had been about the scope of rent-seeking within the law school
community. At the same time, however, I had come to recognize that my
initial conclusion (that rent-seeking is an evil to be minimized) required more
careful consideration in the law school context, where many students expect to
pursue careers as rent-seekers. In addition, I began to appreciate that in a few
limited realms, lobbying could yield information that would improve the
quality of administrative decisions.
This article explores the role of rent-seeking within law schools. In Part I, I
explore the premises that underlie the thesis that rent-seeking in the law school
context is inefficient. Part II examines a number of the opportunities for rentseeking in law schools and suggests how institutional structures might (and
sometimes do) reduce incentives for rent-seekers. Part III develops an
alternative vision-that particularly within law schools, rent-seeking by
students serves an important educational function-and demonstrates that even
if a law school were to embrace that vision, institutional structures that
discourage rent-seeking would generally remain desirable.
I.

RENT-SEEKING IN LAW SCHOOLS: WHAT IS IT AND
Is THERE ANYTHING WRONG WITH IT?

Suppose the federal government were to deal with a budget surplus not by
cutting taxes or reducing the debt but by advertising that the surplus would be
distributed to those persons or groups that make the most eloquent appeals for
the money. 2 The advertisement would undoubtedly spur some people to
1
Rent-seeking is a term "designed to describe behavior in institutional settings where
individual efforts to maximize value generate social waste rather than social surplus."
James M. Buchanan, Rent Seeking and Profit Seeking, in TOWARD A THEORY OF THE RENTSEEKING SOCIETY 3, 4 (James M. Buchanan et al. eds., I 980).
2
As Gordon Tullock has observed, the government is more likely to offer interest groups
benefits other than cash: "The reason this method [offering cash] is almost never used is that
it would be too obvious. It is necessary to fool the average man, at least to a small extent,
and hence a method of transferring funds to the special interest which is less efficient must
be adopted." Gordon Tullock, The Backward Society: Static Inefficiency, Rent Seeking, and
the Rule of Law, in THE THEORY OF PUBLIC CHOICE II 224, 229 (James M . Buchanan &
Robert D. Tollison eds. , 1984).
Moreover, the federal government would never run such an advertisement, nor would it
have to. Interest groups and lobbyists understand that benefits are available to those with
sufficient persuasive powers. As Richard Epstein has noted, "any grant of legislative power
will invite 'rent-seeking' behavior; each group will try to use that legislative power to
expropriate the wealth of its rivals." Richard A. Epstein, Toward a Revitalization of the
Contract Clause, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 703, 713 (1984). Moreover, "[i]ndividuals will let their
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devote time and money to preparing their appeals. Although there is no
guarantee that any individual would be successful, for many individuals, the
investment in lobbying would have a higher expected return than a comparable
investment in other activity. For each of those individuals, a decision to lobby
would be rational. 3 But will the combined lobbying efforts of these individuals
generate an overall social gain?
One possibility is that the lobbying efforts will produce information that
enables decisionmakers to improve the quality of their decisions. Perhaps, for
instance, the government has earmarked money for scientific research designed
to generate a cure for disease or to generate some other public good.
Lobbying, in the form of grant applications, may enable decisionmakers to
make decisions that best advance those ends, generating an increase in social
welfare.
On the other hand, the information derived from the lobbying process is
inherently suspect. For many potential participants in the process, the expected
return from lobbying is smaller than the return they can command by devoting
their resources to productive activity. This will be especially true for potential
participants who, individually, have small stakes in the outcome of the
lobbying process. Because these potential participants, who may be large in
number, may not find it worth their while to lobby, decisionmakers will find
that their information base is skewed, making it less likely that government
decisions will actually increase social welfare.
Even if the information produced by lobbyists were accurate, however, use
of the information would not necessarily result in social gain. Frequently,
lobbyists compete over a fixed pool of resources; no allocation by
decisionmakers will result in the production of more goods and services. In
these instances, any allocations made as a result of the lobbying constitute
economic rents-payments over and above what the lobbyists could command
by deploying their resources in any alternative use. 4 The competitors are
merely fighting over economic rents. 5
The cost of this rent-seeking behavior is two-fold. First, the resources of the
wealth be taken away from them so long as the costs of changing such political outcomes
are greater [note: original mistakenly reads "less"] than the amount of wealth taken away."
Robert E. McCormick & Robert D. Tollison, Wealth Transfers in a Representative
Democracy, in TOWARD A THEORY OF THE RENT-SEEKING SOCIETY, supra note 1, at 293.
3
Sometimes the decision is not rational. For a game-theoretic examination of the
conditions in which it would be rational for a participant to engage in the rent-seeking
process, see Gordon Tullock, Efficient Rent Seeking, in TOWARD A THEORY OF THE RENTSEEKING SOCIETY, supra note l, at 97, l O1-12.
4
See Buchanan, supra note 1, at 8 ("Resources devoted to efforts to curry the queen's
favor might be used to produce valued goods and services elsewhere in the economy,
whereas nothing of net value is produced by rent seeking.")
5
James Buchanan offers the textbook definition of economic rent: "Rent is that part of
the payment to an owner of resources over and above that which those resources could
command in any alternative use. Rent is receipt in excess of opportunity cost." Id. at 3.
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competitors are diverted from the production of goods and services to an
activity that produces no goods or services. Moreover, rent-seeking begets
more rent-seeking. Some potential participants in the rent-seeking process will
initially calculate that their resources will generate maximum return in
productive activities. As others engage in rent-seeking, however, the calculus
may change. Persons who, at first, would have abstained from rent-seeking
will enter the process to avoid becoming prey to less productive competitors.
Second, allocating the economic rents requires the time and energy of a
class of decisionmakers; someone must read and evaluate those eloquent
appeals for money and other resources. Rent-seeking generates these costs
even if we assume no "corruption" in the process, that is, even if the
decisionmakers were to make good-faith efforts to determine which appeals
are most eloquent rather than allocating the surplus on other criteria that better
promote their own self-interest. 6
This analysis leads to the conclusion that legal regimes that promote
lobbying for a fixed set of resources can be efficient only if the information
generated by the lobbying has the potential to identify recipients who will use
the funds in ways that will increase social welfare. Even in those situations,
however, the costs associated with lobbying may overwhelm the increase in
social welfare. In other circumstances, a regime that promotes lobbying will
generally be inefficient; by reducing the incentive to lobby, the regime could
increase the incentive to engage in productive activity and thus increase the
aggregate wealth of society. 7
Move, then, to law school administration. Like the federal government, the
law school as an institution has a number of benefits it can confer on students
and faculty. For students, the law school can offer (among other benefits)
scholarship money, the opportunity to enroll in attractive courses with popular
professors, high grades that will increase employment opportunities, and the
opportunity to take exams in advantageous conditions. For faculty, the law
school can offer high salaries or research stipends (within budgetary
constraints), attractive (which often means non-demanding) teaching loads,
physical amenities, titles, and freedom from institutional duties.
Unlike the federal government, however, every law school faces
competition from other law schools, 8 a fact that should (and does) reduce the
6

The process of obtaining foundation grants is, perhaps, one of the best contemporary
examples of rent-seeking. Because foundations solicit proposals for grants, universities and
other institutions pay salaries and consultant fees to people whose specialty is not
conducting the studies for which the grants are designed, but rather writing grant proposals.
The efforts expended on these proposals do not in any way increase the aggregate funds
available; indeed, the monies spent on soliciting grants reduces the total value of the grants
themselves.
7
See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice
Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REv. 275, 310 (1988) (asserting that raising
the costs associated with rent-seeking reduces incentives to engage in the practice).
8
Increasingly, even the federal government faces competition from abroad, competition
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opportunities for students and faculty to extract rents from the institution. 9 For
instance, a law school that pays faculty salaries above market rates may find it
increasingly difficult to compete for students against other institutions with
lower instructional costs. Similarly, an institution that routinely awards all of
its students "A's" may find its graduates spurned on the job market, reducing
the institution's attractiveness to applicants.
Ultimately, however, competition among law schools places only moderate
limits on the ability of a law school to dole out rents. First, law school
prestige, a critical factor in applicant choice, is often fixed by events and
achievements in the distant past. 10 A "brand name" law school, no matter how
badly managed, cannot easily dissipate its power to attract able students. 11 For
many applicants, it is association with the brand name, rather than the
education the student expects to receive or the cost associated with that
education, that makes a school attractive. 12 Harvard Law School could double

that may limit opportunities for rent-seeking behavior within the United States and within
other nation-states. See generally John 0. McGinnis & Mark L. Movsesian, The World
Trade Constitution, 114 HARV. L. REv. 511 (2000) (discussing the prospect that free
international trade will reduce power of interest groups within each nation state); John 0.
McGinnis, The Decline of the Western Nation State and the Rise of the Regime of
International Federalism, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 903, 916-17 (1996) (discussing the prospect
that international competition will constrain interest groups).
9 Competition, however, may be limited by the American Bar Association' s ("ABA")
accreditation process, which, by setting minimum standards for law schools, limits the ways
in which law schools may compete. See Ronald Cass, The How and Why of Law School
Accreditation, 45 J. LEGAL EDUC. 418, 422-23 ( 1995) (arguing that the accreditation process
limits Jaw school competition by increasing costs of legal education, and particularly by
increasing the cost of faculty); George B. Shepherd & William G. Shepherd, Scholarly
Restraints? ABA Accreditation and Legal Education, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 2091, 2098
(1998) (asserting that ABA accreditation standards restrict innovations in law school
administration).
Failure to become accredited is a serious handicap to a law school's ability to attract
students. See Harry First, Competition in the Legal Education Industry, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV.
311, 328 (1978) (arguing that accreditation status affects a law school' s ability to attract
students because access to state bar exams and federal funding requires that students attend
ABA-accredited institutions).
10
See Brian Leiter, Measuring the Academic Distinction of Law Faculties, 29 J. LEGAL
STUD. 451, 455 (2000) ("But as the old saying goes: 'Reputations die hard and are long in
being born.' The suspicion is widespread that subjective reputational surveys report
yesterday's news about faculty quality, not today's.").
11
See John Mixon & Gordon Otto, Contiguous Quality Improvement, Law, and Legal
Education, 43 EMORY L.J. 393,442 (1994) ("[M]any law schools are immune from market
forces. National law schools' status ensures an abundant supply of applicants who can
afford the price of admission."); see also David C. Yamada, Same Old, Same Old: Law
School Rankings and the Affirmation of Hierarchy, 31 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 249, 261-62
(1997) (emphasizing static reputations oflaw schools over a forty-year period).
12 For an excellent account of the coordination function played by law school rankings
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tuition, or give all students "A's," or double the average class size to reduce
faculty teaching loads without fear of losing many students to schools outside
the "top 10."
Geography is a second factor that confers on most law schools some degree
of monopoly power. For many law school applicants, the choice of law
schools is limited by geographical factors often dictated by cost concerns or
family commitments. Geography is especially important beyond the top
twenty or so law schools where applicants may perceive that the lasting
advantages of prestige will outweigh other issues. Many areas are served by
only one law school or by one school in a particular "tier" in the law school
hierarchy. Thus, prestige and geography together operate to increase the
ability of law schools to dole out rents.
Finally, with respect to already-matriculated students, mobility is extremely
limited. Transfer to another law school is possible, but it is difficult unless the
applicant has a record demonstrating academic success. Moreover, transfer
creates significant personal and professional costs, including reduced
opportunities for mentoring, difficult-to-understand transcripts, and a signal
that the student lacks commitment. As a result, so long as the law school
administration doles out rents in a way that does not generate financial cost or
outside publicity, competition will act as, at most, a modest constraint.
The analysis so far suggests that competition will not significantly constrain
the rent-seeking process in law schools. By analogy to rent-seeking from the
federal government, then, it would appear that the many opportunities for rentseeking create inefficiency. Remember, however, that it is the opportunity
costs associated with rent-seeking that leads to inefficiency; people who
engage in lobbying, an activity that generates no social wealth, would instead
engage in wealth-producing activity but for the prospect of economic rents that
lobbying might generate. Before concluding that rent-seeking is inefficient in
the law school context, one has to confront a preliminary question: what
productive activity would take place if rent-seeking were eliminated? 13
With respect to students, a reasonable hypothesis would be that time

and the importance to prospective students of purchasing a "brand name" education, see
Russell Korobkin, In Praise of Law School Rankings: Solutions to Coordination and
Collective Action Problems, 77 TEX. L. REV. 403,409 (1998) ("'High quality' students . ..
need a way to signal their quality to employers that cannot be imitated by 'lower quality'
students. They do this by responding to rankings. By choosing a school with a high
ranking, the student sends an important signal to future employers: he is brainy or clever
enough to be accepted by a more selective school.").
13 See David Gray Carlson, Debt Collection as Rent Seeking, 79 MINN. L. REv. 817, 817
(1995). Carlson's critique identifies an often-ignored assumption in the literature on rentseeking behavior: the assumption that the second best alternative available to rent-seekers
would not create negative externalities. He points out, however, that this assumption is not
invariably true. In his words, perhaps the potential rent-seeker's next best alternative "is
robbing banks or kidnapping children or something socially worse than the petty corruption
at hand." Id.
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devoted to lobbying is time diverted from some combination of studying and
personal entertainment. 14 Although reading novels and watching basketball
games undoubtedly increase student happiness, it seems reasonable to assume
that the inefficiency caused by less student leisure is de minimis. Is the same
true of lost study time? Study time in this context includes not merely time
squirreled away in the library but also time spent in discussion with classmates
and faculty about legal theory and practice.
Suppose legal education makes students better lawyers. On this assumption,
fewer hours devoted to legal education would generate less capable lawyers.
Therefore, if students devote time to lobbying rather than studying, they divert
energies from productive activity to activity that generates no social wealth. 15
If students recognize that studying contributes to their professional capacity,
many will choose to study rather than to lobby even if rent-seeking
opportunities are available. But for others, the benefits available from rentseeking-higher grades, better or easier courses-will appear more attractive
than the marginal benefits derived from additional hours of study. 16 The
decision of these students to lobby generates a social cost-fewer well-trained
lawyers- with no corresponding social benefit.
Now suppose that legal education does not create better lawyers but merely
provides a sorting mechanism for legal employers. 17 Make the further
assumption that employers prefer high grades because those grades generally
predict strong lawyering abilities. 18 On these assumptions, student lobbying
generates social costs if studying would be helpful in obtaining higher grades.
Only if studying were not helpful in obtaining higher grades-if some students
are born to take law school exams and others are not-would time spent
lobbying be free of social cost. 19

14 Another possibility would be that students would reduce the hours they devote to parttime work in order to pursue lobbying. Assuming that the opportunities for lobbying for any
individual student are sporadic rather than continuous, the likelihood that a student would
adjust his or her work schedule to accommodate increased lobbying appears slim.
15
The calculus changes somewhat if lobbying itself contributes to the student's legal
education. See discussion infra Part III.
16 Indeed, the students least likely to succeed in the profession may be those most likely
to engage in rent-seeking. For them, the gains to be derived from additional studying may
be small, so the opportunity cost ofrent-seeking will also be small.
17 See Korobkin, supra note 12, at 409 (discussing the sorting function of legal
education).
18 It is possible, of course, that law school grades do not correlate at all with lawyering
skills but that employers need to sort applicants on some basis and use law school grades
because they seem less arbitrary than other, equally irrelevant, criteria, such as skin color,
eye color, or length of last name.
19
Beyond opportunity cost, a law school regime that encourages student rent-seeking
generates another cost: demoralization of students.
When lobbying efforts prove
unsuccessful, the student lobbyist can become frustrated and demoralized by his failure ;
when lobbying efforts are successful in obtaining rents, classmates may become resentful.
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Similarly, faculty rent-seeking would appear to divert time from more
productive pursuits, such as scholarship and preparation for class. One might
question the intrinsic global value of each additional work of legal scholarship,
but at the very least, scholarship has value in sorting academic institutions. 20
Moreover, from the institution's own perspective, additional faculty
scholarship brings distinction that assists in attracting new students and
faculty. 21
Finally-and from the perspective of an Associate Dean, this is a critical
part-rent-seeking by students and faculty does more than divert the energies
of the rent-seekers; rent-seeking also requires time and energy to respond to
the lobbying efforts by the various constituencies. This, in tum, could require
hiring additional administrative personnel or diverting existing administrators
from scholarship or teaching or, even worse from the institution's perspective,
from fundraising.
Rent-seeking, then, can be a drain on the resources of the law schoolstudents, faculty, and administrators. Thus, the next question is whether rentseeking is a constant or whether governance rules can reduce the incidence of
rent-seeking within the law school community.
II.

CONTROLLING RENT-SEEKING BEHAVIOR

Law school governance structures are not pre-ordained. Like other
institutions, law schools can choose governance structures that confer on
decisionmakers more or less discretion. 22 The choice necessarily involves
tradeoffs. Inflexible rules arguably increase the risk of error in administrative
determinations because the rules may not contemplate all situations that
subsequently arise. 23 At the same time, broad grants of discretion-at least in
the law school context-are likely to generate more rent-seeking than
inflexible rules that leave the decisionmaker with little discretion.
First, inflexible rules discourage rent-seeking because the rent-seeker's
probability of success is reduced. 24 If the rent-seeker's time has any value,

20

Scholarship plays a significant role in most law school rankings. U.S. News and
World Report, for instance, includes scholarship indirectly by measuring academic
reputation. Other influential rankings focus more directly on faculty scholarship as a basis
for sorting schools. See, e.g., Leiter, supra note 10, at 455-56.
21 With respect to preparation for class, if we assume that more preparation leads to
better teaching-as measured either by improved quality of lawyering by students in the
class or by increased student satisfaction with the class-the institution as a whole benefits
from improved teaching, either through improved employment opportunities or through
increased alumni giving.
22 See Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65,
72-76 (1983) (discussing the tradeoffs among rules conferring on decisionmakers various
levels of discretion).
23
See id. at 73.
24 Gordon Tullock has made the point by noting that if Mayor Richard Daley of Chicago
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why squander that time on requests that the decisionmaker cannot grant? By
contrast, if the decisionmaker has discretion, the investment in lobbying has a
greater expected return. 25 In addition, when the decisionmaker has discretion,
the rent-seeker has another weapon in his arsenal: skewed incentives for the
decisionmaker. If the decisionmaker accedes to the rent-seeker's request, the
decisionmaker is, at least in the short run, finished with the rent-seeker. By
contrast, if the decisionmaker says no, the rent-seeker may continue to lobby,
forcing the decisionmaker to expend more time and energy considering the
request. This fact itself increases the incentive for rent-seekers to lobby in a
regime where decisionmakers have discretion.
Second, inflexible rules reduce the time spent on each lobbying effort even
when rent-seekers persist in the face of a rule. Rather than explaining to the
lobbyist why his or her request lacks merit, the decisionmaker can simply
represent that her hands are tied-an answer that is short and sweet but also
less threatening to the psyche of the rent-seeker. 26
Inflexible rules, of course, ~re no panacea. So long as rent-seekers face little
opportunity cost, lobbying will continue even if the lobbyists perceive that the
likelihood of success is small. 27
Moreover, students, conditioned by
undergraduate experience in which persistence has had a payoff, may
overestimate the likelihood of success, reducing further the deterrent effect of a
law school's regime of inflexible rules. At the margin, however, inflexible
rules will generate less rent-seeking than discretionary rules.
Of course, a regime of inflexible rules might shift some rent-seeking to the
rulemaking process. But rent-seekers, especially in the law school context,
will recognize that success will be more difficult to achieve in the rulemaking
process. When a student lobbies for a higher grade or for more scholarship
money, or a faculty member lobbies for a lighter teaching load, the lobbying is
done in private. The rent-seeker's hope is that the decisionmaker will yield
without giving the opposition a chance to mobilize; indeed, the rent-seeker
may hope that classmates or colleagues do not recognize the harm they have
suffered as a result of rent-seeking. The rulemaking process, by contrast, is
had confined all of his lucrative appointments to close relatives and made his nepotism
policy well known, the social savings would have been considerable because non-relatives
would not have wasted time rent-seeking. Tullock, supra note 3, at 103.
25
Cf Clayton P. Gillette, Expropriation and Institutional Design in State and Local
Government Law, 80 VA. L. REv. 625, 633 (I 994) (arguing that flexibility requires targets
of regulation to invest more effort in ascertaining the scope of their authority because the
measure of acceptable behavior is less certain).
26
See Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REv. 953, 977 (I 995) (stating
that rules can avoid the humiliation associated with exercises of discretion).
27
If the opportunity costs for rent-seeking students are small, one might conclude that
rent-seeking generates little inefficiency; if students did not engage in rent-seeking, they
would not engage in any more productive activity. This conclusion, however, ignores the
fact that student rent-seekers have power to impose costs on others-faculty or
administrators-who must listen to their pleas.
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inherently public, and building the coalitions necessary to change existing
allocations is likely to be difficult. As a result, potential rent-seekers will often
recognize that the effort is doomed, reducing the incentive to engage in rentseeking to begin with.
None of this is to suggest that a regime of inflexible rules operates without
cost. Lobbying has the potential to produce information of value to law school
decisionmakers either because the information will improve the law school's
overall reputation or because the lobbying process will improve institutional
morale by reducing the sense that decisions have been made arbitrarily. 28 My
point is threefold. First, the information generated by a discretionary
governance regime is often low-quality information that will not significantly
improve the decision-making process. Second, to the extent a discretionary
system generates information that is useful at the margin, the information
comes at a price measured in hours of lost productive time. Finally, the
discretionary system itself has the potential for generating significant
unfairness, albeit hidden from view by the private nature of many discretionary
determinations.
With this as background, let us turn to common instances of rent-seeking in
the law school environment to examine the impact of competing governance
structures.

A.

Student Rent-Seeking
1.

Grades

Grades matter-both to law schools and to law students. The law school as
an entity has an interest both in maintaining a grading system and in assuring
that grades measure, with some accuracy, the likely success of students as
lawyers. First, some grading system is almost certainly necessary for student
placement purposes. Employers might reduce hiring from a school that refuses
to sort students and from a school that reduces incentives for students to
work. 29 Moreover, the law school benefits when high grades correlate well
with performance in practice because firms will be more likely to recruit at a
school where grades have predictive value.
Second, prospective applicants, particularly strong applicants, might be
reluctant to attend a law school with no grading system or an arbitrary grading

28

Cf Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Acijudication, 89 HARV. L.
REV. 1685, 1687-89 (1976) (discussing the potential of rules to operate arbitrarily).
29 Cf Philip C. Kissam, Law School Examinations, 42 VAND. L. REV. 433, 436 (1989)
(arguing that grading and ranking systems serve the hiring purposes of many law firms). Of
course, a school that can be sufficiently selective in the admissions process may be able to
convince firms to hire its students even if the school did not use grades to sort its students.
Yale, for instance, can afford to provide less grade differentiation than most other schools
because potential employers are aware that students admitted are, to an extent greater than at
most other schools, self-motivated and talented.
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system, because the absence of meaningful grades will reduce their opportunity
to stand out. The result might be adverse selection: the students most likely to
come to the school would be those who intend not to study or those who
expect, for other reasons, to do poorly. In addition, even if a law school could
overcome these problems, the absence of grades would create pressure for
faculty to evaluate students in other, perhaps more time-consuming ways, such
as by writing extensive recommendation letters. As a result, virtually every
law school faces irresistible pressure to use a grading system that reflects
student performance with some degree of accuracy. At the same time, law
school grades are critical to students. The understandable student preoccupation with grades creates additional pressure to ensure that grades are
assigned fairly rather than arbitrarily.
How, then, should law schools structure the process of gathering
information relevant to assigning student grades? One possibility would be to
have faculty weigh all information they accumulate about student ability
during the course of the semester. This, however, would be an invitation to
rent-seeking behavior by students. Because students perceive a significant
correlation between high grades and professional success, they have an
incentive to lobby for grades that improve their absolute grade point average
("GPA") or their relative rank in class. For instance, a student might impress
upon a faculty member the importance of receiving a high grade in a course
related to the practice the student hopes to pursue. Or the student whose first
effort was inadequate might offer to do whatever the faculty member thought
necessary to improve the grade the student earned.
Note the problem. This weigh-all-factors grading system places a premium
on willingness to communicate information about performance rather than on
performance itself. Of course, most discourse between students and faculty
has little to do with lobbying for grades or favors; discourse both in and out of
the classroom is an essential part of the educational process. Some students,
however, have little interest in discourse but might nevertheless visit faculty
members for the purpose of creating a positive mental impression that the
faculty member will remember at grading time. The information that results
from these encounters is not likely to enhance grading accuracy. First, because
students will have differential incentives to lobby with faculty members, outof-classroom discussions with students are likely to produce a skewed picture
of student understanding and performance. Second, even if faculty members
consider only information relevant to student understanding, some students
will misperceive the factors that will lead to a higher grade and will attempt to
curry favor in ways that do not reflect greater understanding of course material.
Anonymous grading of exams and papers, by contrast, reduces the incentive
for student lobbying before exams and papers are graded. At the same time,
anonymous grading does not in any way discourage students who consult
faculty members to enhance their understanding of course material. There is,
of course, a cost to anonymous grading: to the extent that some students
perform better orally than in writing, their strengths may receive inadequate
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consideration. A law school might plausibly conclude that this cost is
insignificant in a profession where written expression is critical. Alternatively,
the school might permit modest adjustments to reflect exemplary classroom
performance. A regime that significantly constrains discretion without
eliminating it is likely to reduce the incidence of wasteful lobbying efforts.
Another grading issue involves student requests that faculty members reread and re-grade their exams or papers. When a st11dent asks a faculty
member to review an exam, the student typically expects the faculty member to
make sure that the faculty member did not miss some significant point in the
faculty member's initial reading of the exam. The underlying premise is that
more information-derived from more careful reading-will result in a more
accurate assessment of student performance. The premise, however, is flawed.
If the complaining student's analysis can be discerned only after more careful
reading of the exam, then the student has probably not expressed himself as
clearly as did his classmates. As a result, the original grade, not the one that
results from more careful reading, may well be the better indicator of
performance. More generally, awarding credit based on an isolated reading of
one exam, out of context with others graded weeks earlier, is unlikely to result
in a more accurate assessment than the original assessment. To assure that the
complaining student is treated fairly with respect to his classmates, the faculty
member would have to reread all exams, not just one, and there would be little
reason to believe (once the exam is read in context) either (l) that the
particular student's performance would appear better rather than worse on
second reading, or (2) that the second reading would be more accurate than the
first.
If rereading a student exam is unlikely to yield useful information about the
appropriate grade, how can law schools deal with student requests in a way
that limits these requests? One way to deal with this problem is to impose a
mandatory grading curve. 30
Whether the school requires a particular
distribution of grades (no more than 10% A's) or a mandatory mean, a curve
permits the faculty member to explain to the rent-seeking student that she
cannot raise the student's grade without lowering someone else's grade, an
alternative that even the rent-seeking student will recognize as prohibitively
unattractive. 31 As with anonymous grading, a grading curve reduces the
incentive for students who consult faculty only for the purpose of rent-seeking
30

See Nancy H. Kaufman, A Survey of Law School Grading Practices, 44 J.

LEGAL

EDUC. 415, 417-18 (1994) (surveying use of mandatory grading curves at law schools).
3 1 Some educational literature concludes that grading on a curve is undesirable because it
fosters competition among students, impeding a cooperative learning environment. See,
e.g., Terence J. Crooks, The Impact of Classroom Evaluation Practices on Students, 58 REY.
EDUC. RES. 438, 458 (1988) (finding that "competitive structures involve negative
interdependence because success for one student reduces the chances that other students will
succeed"). That disadvantage, however, must be weighed not only against the evils of rentseeking but also against the potential unfairness of substantially different grading standards
in different sections of the same course-a problem particularly important in law schools.
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without discouraging in any way those students who seek to go over their
exams as a learning experience. Moreover, not only does a curve discourage
rent-seeking, but it also reduces the time faculty members must spend with
students whose focus is rent-seeking: rather than debating the intrinsic merits
of the student's answer, the faculty member can explain that, whatever the
answer's merits, other students wrote still better answers. There are, however,
two limits on the curve's effectiveness in deterring student rent-seeking. First,
any curve is likely to leave some discretion to faculty members, and second,
student rent-seekers may not readily appreciate the connection between the
curve and the faculty member's inability to raise student grades in response to
lobbying efforts. 32
A system that precludes all grade changes once grades have been submitted
to the registrar, or one that precludes all changes absent "computational error"
or some similar mechanical standard, should be even more effective in
discouraging rent-seeking. Consider first a system that gives individual faculty
members complete discretion whether and under what circumstances to adjust
grades. Some faculty members would change grades; others would not. The
system has several immediate drawbacks. 33 First, it prevents any faculty
member from relying on an inflexible rule imposed by higher authority to
justify her refusal to raise grades. Instead, the faculty member must justify her
own rule precluding grade adjustments. Second, it permits faculty members
who do raise grades to impose externalities on those who do not: the very fact
that some faculty members raise grades will encourage students to lobby with
all faculty members about grade changes.
By contrast, if grade changes are prohibited, each student understands, or
quickly learns, that speaking with a faculty member about an exam is useful
only to learn from mistakes, not to alter the student's grade. This results in less
wasted time, both by students and by faculty.
2. Course Openings
Suppose the size of available classrooms or the pedagogical objectives of
the course require limiting enrollment to a number that excludes interested
32 A mandatory grading curve may also reduce rent-seeking of a different sort: lobbying
efforts to obtain seats in classes of faculty members who are known to be generous graders.
A faculty member who offers the prospect of unusually high grades may find a shortage of
seats in the classroom, inducing lobbying by students eager to fill them.
33 The text focuses only on drawbacks that lead to increased rent-seeking. The rule also
has one other serious drawback: it decreases the accuracy of grades as evaluations of student
performance. When a faculty member raises one student' s grade without re-reading all
student papers, the chances are slim that the new grade-arrived at after reading a single
paper in isolation with every incentive to buckle under student pressure-will more
accurately reflect the student's relative performance than did the original grade, arrived at
after reading a series of exams and comparing each to the others.
In addition, when faculty members are bound by rules prohibiting grade changes, they are
more likely to grade carefully than if they know errors can be corrected easily after the fact.
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students. How should places in the class be allocated? Unlike the situation
with law school grades, the law school as an institution has no significant stake
in which students take particular courses. Presumably, the most efficient
allocation is one that awards places in enrollment-limited courses to students
who value those places most. But law schools (and universities in general)
have universally been unwilling to allocate these scarce resources though a
market-oriented willingness-to-pay system. A cynic might suggest that the
resistance to market allocation reflects the ideological proclivities of university
faculties, but the more likely explanation rests on the public relations disaster a
university would face if students (and their tuition-paying relatives) understood
that the payment of tuition to a school with a renowned faculty earned the
student the privilege to pay additional tuition to take courses with that faculty.
A school could try to ascertain student interest by interviewing the
applicants for places in an individual class. But an allocation system based on
discretionary determinations of student need or interest constitutes an open
invitation to rent-seeking. Every interested student has a story about why
Entertainment Law is essential to his or her legal career. Neither an
administrator nor a faculty member is in a particularly good position to assess
the relative merit of these stories. As a result, student lobbying does not
generate particularly reliable information about the value the student attaches
to a place in the class. The decisionmaker could, of course, allocate spaces in
the course based on perseverance,34 but that allocation system creates precisely
the wrong set of incentives; it creates incentives to spend time lobbying for the
scarce seats in the classroom.
Indeed, even if a particular decisionmaker were confident that he or she
could assess the relative need or interest of the claims of applicants for
positions in the class, the costs of hearing pleas by applicants who do not
understand why they should be deemed less needy or interested than others
would often overwhelm the marginal advantages of need or interest based
allocations.
By contrast, mechanical determinations minimize opportunities for rentseeking. A first-come, first-served system-like a recording system based on a
"race to the courthouse"35-leaves little room for interpretation, and therefore
34

Perseverance might be regarded as a surrogate for interest or need: the students who
persevere are those most willing to commit their valuable time to lobbying for spaces in the
class, and are therefore the students most interested in the class or most in need of the class.
Time committed to lobbying, however, generates no intrinsic benefits. Only if there is no
less costly means of sorting students by need or interest (such as use of prerequisites), and
only if difference in need among students is significant, would it be sensible to allocate slots
based on perseverance.
35 For a discussion of the historical development of recording statutes for real property
beginning with the enactment of statutes focusing exclusively on the "race" to the court
house, see Taylor Mattis, Recording Acts: Anachronistic Reliance, 25 REAL PROP. PROB. &
TR. J. 17, 23-25 (1990) (discussing the evolution of various recording statute schemes).
Mattis goes on to note how quickly equitable exceptions were engrafted onto pure race
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little room for lobbying. The rule does have two drawbacks, however. First, it
invites pleading based on justifications for lateness. Some students will plead
lack of knowledge about the time for sign-ups; others will offer justifications
for their failure to sign up on time. Second, a first-come, first-served system
does cause students to allocate time inefficiently: should they leave summer
jobs a day early or return from vacation in order to sign up early? No apparent
gains result from inducing students to sign up at a particular time. A lottery
system, by contrast, eliminates these difficulties. Students are free to sign up
at their convenience within whatever period is designated for that purpose, and
only students who failed to sign up at all-a group with weak equity claimswill be in a position to raise "notice" issues.
Moreover, an educational institution could fine-tune a mechanical system by
developing rules that take into account student interest or need. At the most
basic level, the institution could establish prerequisites for popular courses or
could give an absolute preference to third-year students over second-year
students. The institution could even introduce a more sophisticated marketlike mechanism by allocating to each student a number of points the student
could use to "bid" for courses that most closely match the student's interest or
need. Places in each class would then be allocated to students who bid the
most for them. Any of these mechanical mechanisms for allocating places in
courses would appear preferable to a system of individualized determination
based on expressions of student interest.
There remains the possibility that an individual faculty member enjoys
interviewing and evaluating applications for scarce spaces in her popular class.
Moreover, in clinical classes, faculty members may owe an obligation to
potential clients to select students with the maturity and competence to serve
client needs. 36 If the law school permits individualized selection in these
situations, the law school would minimize any spillover effects by labeling the
courses involved as requiring permission of the instructor. The objective
would be to distinguish them from other classes and to make clear that in other
classes, lobbying will be useless.
3.

Exam Conditions

The Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") is designed to assure that
students with disabilities enjoy, to every extent possible, a playing field level
with that of other students. 37 Moreover, even apart from federal law, many law

statutes. Id. at 24-25 .
36
Cf Norman Fell, Development of a Criminal Law Clinic: A Blended Approach, 44
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 275, 297 (1996) (noting maturity needed for students in extemship-type
clinical programs).
37
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213
(200 I), encompasses state law schools through Title II (§§ 12131-12165) and private law
schools through Title Ill (§§ 12181-12189). Title II, section 12132, provides that "no
qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from
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faculties want to assist students with disabilities to insure a "level playing
field" for all students. 38 As a result of the ADA, increasing numbers of
students are seeking accommodations of various sorts. 39 This presents law
participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public
entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity." Id § 12132. A "public entity"
is defined by section 1213l(l)(B) as "any department, agency, special purpose district, or
other instrumentality of a State or States or local government." Id § 12131(1). State-run
schools fall into this category. Section 12131 defines the term "qualified individual with a
disability" as
an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable modifications to rules,
policies, or practices, the removal of ... communication . .. barriers, or the provision
of auxiliary aids and services, meets the essential eligibility requirements for the
receipt of services or the participation in programs or activities provided by a public
entity.
Id
Title III, section 12182(a) dictates that "[n]o individual shall be discriminated against on
the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities,
privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any
person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation." Id. §
12182(a). Then, section 12181(7)(1), specifically lists "postgraduate private school[s]" as
types of public accommodation covered under section 12182. Id§ 12181(7)(1). Section
12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) includes under its definition of discrimination, "a failure to make
reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are
necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or
accommodation to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that
making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services,
facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation." Id § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii). Finally,
section 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii) calls for the provision of auxiliary aids and services "unless . ..
taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility,
privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden."
Id § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii).
Law schools also fall under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S .C. § 794 (2001 ), which
mandates in subsection (a) that "[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a disability ...
shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance." 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2001). Section 794(b)(2)(A)
includes "a college, university, or other postsecondary institution, or a public system of
higher education" in the definition of"program or activity." Id § 794(b)(2)(A).
38 Indeed, some scholars have argued that law schools should provide accommodations
beyond those required by federal law. See, e.g., Kevin H. Smith, Disabilities, Law Schools,
and Law Students: A Proactive and Holistic Approach, 32 AKRON L. REV. 1, 8 (1999)
(mentioning that the ADA creates a floor, not a ceiling, for protection of the disabled).
39 See, e.g., Phyllis G. Coleman et al., Law Students and the Disorder of Written
Expression, 26 J. L. & EDUC. I, 9 ( 1997). Coleman also notes that
[f]or many years, law students did not ask for accommodations and frequently even
attempted to disguise their disabilities to "pass" as part of the "normal" population ....
Today, however, just the opposite is true, and even students who do not have
disabilities are demanding-and receiving-differential treatment.
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schools with a difficulty: how should the law school determine which
accommodations should be made available to each student?
Some
accommodations are not problematic. For instance, the number of students
seeking classroom accommodations--e.g. note-takers or particular seat
locations-remains relatively small, and making these accommodations
available does not generate significant rent-seeking opportunities. A notetaker is likely to be of little value to a student who does not suffer under a
significant disability. As a result, few students will lobby hard for the right to
a note-taker, no matter what qualification rules the school adopts.
With respect to exam conditions, however, the situation is materially
different. Almost every law student, disabled or not, would benefit (or
perceives that he or she would benefit) from extra time on exams. This
presents law school administration with two challenges: first, determining
whether a disability exists, and second, determining what accommodation is
appropriate.
Law school administrators possess no special expertise in evaluating
disability claims.
And no law school wants to establish an internal
administrative bureaucracy with the capacity to evaluate individual claims of
disability. Moreover, any mechanism that accords substantial discretion to law
school decisionmakers will induce rent-seeking activity by students seeking to
benefit from the accommodations available. To combat these difficulties, law
schools will gravitate toward mechanical rules or, where mechanical rules are
difficult to codify, defer to some other decisionmaker. Thus, when the issue is
language disability, the law school could provide accommodation only for
students who can establish that they have lived in an English-speaking country
for less than three years. Or the law school could provide that only students
who have not received a degree from an English-language institution are
entitled to accommodation. Either rule will generate less rent-seeking than a
rule that permits students to demonstrate, individually, their language
difficulties. Moreover, a regime of discretion is unlikely to produce more

Id. at 9 n.31 (citations omitted); see also Laura F. Rothstein, Symposium: The Americans
with Disabilities Act: A Ten-Year Retrospective: Higher Education and the Future of
Disability Policy, 52 ALA. L. REv. 241 , 243-44 (2000) (arguing that "[t]he passage of the
Americans with Disabilities Act in 1990 ... opened a floodgate of complaints, both to the
Department of Education and in the courts" and noting the American Council on
Education's 1998 report, indicating that one out of every eleven college freshman had a
disability, a threefold increase from the number reported in I 978); Donald Stone, The
Impact of the Americans with Disabilities Act on Legal Education and Academic
Modifications for Disabled Law Students: An Empirical Study, 44 KAN. L. REV. 567 (1996)
(reporting academic modification requests to law schools, primarily for extra exam time, but
also for separate examination rooms, extension of time for degree completion, priority in
course registration, and authorization to tape record classes, all by virtue of an entitlement
under the mandates of the ADA). The results of Professor Stone's empirical study show
that within the eighty law schools surveyed in the 1994-1995 academic year, only two
percent of requests for modification were denied. Id.
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accurate information about whether accommodation is necessary to provide a
level playing field; hence, little is lost by treating the problem mechanically.
With respect to physical disabilities, one alternative is to require students to
demonstrate that they received accommodation on the LSAT. A second
alternative--one that would be more attractive to students claiming
disabilities-would be to require documentation from a physician. Whichever
alternative the law school adopts, there would be little room for lobbying
behavior because the law school would exercise no discretion in evaluating
disability claims.
Deference to physician evaluations might result in
acceptance of some exaggerated claims of disability (resulting in potential
unfairness to students without disabilities) but remains a more desirable
alternative than one based on internal law school evaluation of disability
claims. 40 Moreover, because both physicians and LSAT administrators are
likely to be better trained and more experienced than law school administrators
when it comes to evaluating disability claims, deference to these
decisionmakers is unlikely to interfere with the law school's objective of
providing a level playing field.41
Once the law school determines that a disability exists, the school must
determine what accommodation is reasonable. 42 Many accommodations do

40

Physicians at least have some expertise in the area, even if students will be "biased"
toward consulting physicians more likely to find disabilities.
41 By contrast, the easiest rule to administer-no one receives extra time of special
accommodations-would violate federal law and frustrate the law school's internal
objective of providing a level playing field. See supra note 37 (discussing applicable
federal law concerning special accommodations).
42 34 C.F.R. § 104.44(a) (2000), a regulation promulgated pursuant to the Rehabilitation
Act, requires that
[a] recipient [of federal financial assistance] to which this subpart applies shall make
such modifications to its academic requirements as are necessary to ensure that such
requirements do not discriminate or have the effect of discriminating, on the basis of
handicap, against a qualified handicapped applicant or student . . . . Modifications may
include changes in the length of time permitted for the completion of degree
requirements, substitution of specific courses required for the completion of degree
requirements, and adaptation of the manner in which specific courses are conducted.
34 C.F.R. § 104.44(a) (2000).
Title III of the ADA requires "reasonable" modifications "unless the entity can
demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such
goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations." 42 U.S.C. §
12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) (2001). Although it can be argued that working within limited time
constraints is fundamental to the nature of the law school program, most of the cases
addressing extra exam time focus on whether the individual had learning or other disabilities
to justify the accommodation and not whether additional exam time constitutes a
fundamental alteration to the school' s program. See, e.g., Bartlett v. N.Y. State Bd. of Law
Exam'rs, 156 F.3d 321 (2d Cir. 1998). Indeed, the generally accepted wisdom, as reported
(disapprovingly) by Freedley Hunsicker, is that time extensions do not threaten essential
standards. Freedley Hunsicker, Learning Disabilities, Law Schools and the Lowering of the
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not invite rent-seeking at all. Few students would feign disabilities to obtain
readers, scribes, or isolated test-taking environments.
Offering these
accommodations to disabled students may be costly to the law school but will
not generate a flurry of applications for similar treatment.
Extra time on examinations, however, presents entirely different concerns.
Because all students believe that they would benefit from extra time, a rule that
gives substantially more time to disabled students will generate additional
efforts to qualify as disabled. The law school as an institution has a limited
number of strategies it can employ to deal with the issue. First, the law school
could individually determine how much extra time each student should receive
for his or her particular disability. But few law school administrators will be
equipped to fine-tune the extra time available to a student's particular
disability. Information provided by individual students and their advocates
will be unhelpful in making comparative evaluations, yet the prospect of
individualized determinations will encourage individual students to lobby for
as much time as possible.
Second, the law school could provide a blanket percentage of extra time for
all disabilities or for all disabilities of a particular type. The first problem with
this solution has nothing to do with rent-seeking; there is little reason to expect
that such a blanket rule would advance the purposes of the ADA- leveling the
playing field. On top of that, if the institution's blanket extra-time provision is
generous, it will create incentives for students to seek a disability diagnosis. A
more stringent limit on the available extension of time-perhaps an additional
ten or twenty percent of the time of the exam-would reduce the incentive to
seek disability status but might also disadvantage students with particularly
serious disabilities.
The third and perhaps best approach would be to increase the time available
for all students. If all students were allocated six hours to take a three-hour
exam, there would be reduced incentive to seek disability status even if
disabled students were entitled to fifty percent more time on exams; for
students without disabilities, the marginal benefit of the right to sit in an exam
room for nine hours will approach zero. Moreover, if the law school removes
artificial time pressure from exams, the school might be able to dispense with
extra time altogether. Lawyers rarely have to provide clients or courts with a
substantively correct answer to a complex legal question within the hour or
two that might be allotted for a typical exam question, but lawyers, disabled or
not, must have the ability to perform legal tasks within a reasonable time
period. Hence, if law school exams give all students a reasonable time to
analyze a legal problem, the law school may be ab.le to avoid giving disabled
students still more time by demonstrating that completion of the exam' s
questions within the reasonable period available to all students is "essential to
the program of instruction being pursued." 43
Bar, 42 S. TEX. L. REV. l , 13-14 (2000).
43 See 34 C.F.R. § l04.44(a) (1996) (stating that accommodations need not encompass
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Scholarships and the Market for Students

Not all of the benefits law schools confer on students constitute economic
rents. Students are not fungible. If they were, law schools would not need
admissions offices. Instead, law schools would allocate spaces in the entering
class based on willingness of students to pay the highest tuition. All schools
recognize, however, that strong students increase the institution's reputation,
both in terms of entry statistics examined by prospective students, and in terms
of placement success. 44 As a result, market forces play a significant role in
where students attend law school. Institutional prestige and geographical
location probably play primary roles in student decisions, but financial aid, or
scholarship money, is also significant, especially in areas where law schools
face competition from schools who are close substitutes in terms of geography
and prestige. As a result, scholarship awards are not entirely rents paid by law
schools but reflect the cost of luring valuable students to the institution in a
competitive market. 45
If law schools award scholarship money to meet competition for strong
students, the awards can be packaged in various ways. The school could
guarantee scholarship money for three years, or could make continuation of the
scholarship contingent upon performance in law school. Which alternative is
preferable depends in large measure on the market preferences of prospective
students. If 75% of scholarship recipients earn a 3.0 average in the first-year
of law school, the law school should generally be indifferent-from a financial
standpoint-between awarding a $10,000 scholarship guaranteed for three
years, and a $12,000 scholarship whose renewal is contingent upon
maintenance of a 3.0 average after the first year. 46 If students prefer to bet on
their own performance, the law school is better off providing conditional
scholarships; if students are more conservative, the law school is better off not
imposing conditions. 47 Neither system, however, has any immediate impact on
requirements "essential to the program of instruction being pursued")
44
The institution's reputation for serving the elite may, in fact, be the most significant
academic measure of the institution's success. See Harry First, Competition in the Legal
Education Industry, 53 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1328 (1978).
45
See Howard 0. Hunter, Thoughts on Being a Dean, 31 U. TOL. L. REV. 641, 643
(2000) (stating that law schools that want to remain competitive according to the generally
accepted criteria will face continuing pressure to increase scholarships).
46
If the law school awards a guaranteed scholarship of $10,000 per year, the total cost
over three years will be $30,000 per scholarship. If the law school offers $12,000 for the
first year, and 75% of the first year recipients receive $12,000 in each of the succeeding two
years, the total cost per scholarship will be $12,000 + (0.75 x $24,000), for a total of
$30,000.
47 The effect of the two alternatives on future alumni donations might also be significant,
but it is not clear what impact each rule would have. Students who lose scholarship money
for inadequate performance are not likely to be significant donors (a disadvantage of
conditional scholarships), but students who receive larger scholarships and keep them may
be more likely to be generous (a corresponding advantage of conditional scholarships,
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the incidence of rent-seeking.
If the institution awards scholarships conditioned on law school
performance, however, rent-seeking problems may arise later, when some
students fail to meet the performance standard. Those students will inevitably
seek to retain their scholarship money, generally attributing their poor
performance to some factor beyond their control-poor teachers, outside
commitments, or ill health. These students will generally have no option to
transfer; in light of their performance in the first year, they have less market
value to all law schools than they had before they started. The law school may
nevertheless decide to allocate some money to some of these students in order
to cultivate better student relations (and, ultimately, better alumni relations).
This would especially be true if an unexpected number of scholarship students
performed poorly. But beyond the money allocated to promote student and
alumni relations, any other scholarship money allocated to this group
constitutes economic rent.
The law school could hear individualized appeals in which students offer
explanations for unexpectedly poor performance. This course of action might
make sense if law school administrators could reliably sort students whose
poor performance was aberrational from those whose poor performance is
likely to continue. But at most law schools, past performance, not the
assessment of an administrator, is likely to be a better predictor of future
performance. Moreover, even if administrators were confident in their ability
to sort under-performing students, the sorting enterprise would encourage all
students who have lost scholarship money to lobby with the designated
decisionmaker. If, by contrast, the law school employs a mechanical standard
(e.g. all students with GPAs of 2.9 or above retain 25% of their original
scholarship money), both the volume of lobbying and the length of time
expended on each lobbying session may be somewhat reduced. 48
Law schools also face scholarship issues with students who have performed
particularly well after a year of law school. Students near the top of the class
may consider transferring to more prestigious institutions. If the law school
wants to retain these students, additional scholarship money provides a
significant inducement for students to stay. A policy awarding additional
scholarships to persons who express an interest in transferring, however,
creates perverse incentives. If the policy becomes known, all of the best
students in the class, including those with no desire to transfer, will apply to
transfer. A policy that gives the appropriate administrator discretion to award
scholarships to particularly deserving students (or to students most likely to
transfer) creates incentives both to fill out transfer applications and to lobby

which permit larger initial awards).
48 Note, however, that lobbying will still occur. The marginal cost of the lobbying effort
to the student is small compared to the potential gain. Even if the probability of success is
very small, thirty minutes of lobbying will generally be worthwhile if the payoff would be
retention ofa $5,000 scholarship.
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with the decisionmaker. In addition, if a particular student fails to secure a
scholarship because he or she is deemed less worthy than other students, the
adverse decision may cause more demoralization than if the decision were less
subjective. As a result, the preferable course is to award scholarship money to
all students who meet a certain well-defined threshold, such as all students in
the top five percent of the class or all those who achieve a GPA of3.6.
5.

Discourse, Participation, and Group Rent-Seeking

The analysis so far has treated rent-seeking as an opportunity cost to the
participants: if students were not involved in the rent-seeking process, they
would be able to engage in more productive pursuits. Suppose, however, that
for some participants, the rent-seeking process generates positive benefits. In
particular, suppose that students enjoy lobbying for benefits. 49 How, if at all,
would the analysis change?
First, for those students who enjoy lobbying irrespective of result, a rule that
discourages rent-seeking will have no impact. They can continue to enjoy
lobbying; the rule assures only that the lobbying will be unsuccessful. The
only students who would suffer a real loss from a system of mechanical rules
would be those for whom lobbying with a prospect for success creates value
apart from the gains actually realized from successful lobbying. But that loss
may be more than offset by the gains to people who view lobbying as a cost
and now receive assurance that they will not suffer when they exercise their
preference not to lobby for benefits.
A more compelling argument is that many students value not lobbying per
se, but participation in the governance of an institution that significantly affects
their lives. so But the desire for participation can be accommodated with less
institutional cost and greater potential benefit by providing students with input
in the process of developing institutional rules, for instance, through
membership on faculty committees rather than by encouraging lobbying for
personal benefits.
49

It is less plausible to assume that faculty and administrators enjoy listening to
complaints; even if they do, it is not clear why it is good for the institution for them to spend
time this way. Few enjoy the process so much that they would leave if they were forced to
spend less time responding to student lobbying.
5 Civic republican theory emphasizes the value of participation in fostering a sense of
community. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, The Republican Civic Tradition: Beyond the
Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1556 (1988) ("[O]n the republican view, political
participation is not only instrumental in the ordinary sense; it is also a vehicle for the
inculcation of such characteristics as empathy, virtue, and feelings of community .. ..").
But see Samuel lssacharoff & Daniel R. Ortiz, Governing Through Intermediaries, 85 VA.
L. REv. 1627, 1636-37 (1999) ("Whenever we participate in the much-vaunted town
meeting, our jobs and hobbies go untended and our friends and families go ignored. Direct
democracy requires work. Worse yet, the town meeting itself can often tum nasty and
unpleasant. Despite the hopes of civic republicans, the agora is no great fun for most
people.").
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Beyond regular participation in the rule-making process, student
participation can ease institutional tensions when unforeseen events create
difficulties not covered by existing rules. One example from my tenure is
illustrative. A visiting professor took much of an open-book Torts exam out of
a student review book, one that the professor did not require students to
purchase. The book also included an analysis of the question. A few students,
but not many, had the book during the exam. When students discovered the
situation, outrage surfaced over the resulting unfairness. One way to deal with
the situation would have been to gather facts about the number of students who
had the book and who read the analysis and then issue an edict providing an
administrative resolution: students all earn "Ps" in the course, or students
retake the exam, or students choose from these or other alternatives. The edict
solution, however, would have been accompanied by two disadvantages. First,
it would have deprived the decisionmaker-me--of student suggestions about
optimal solutions I might not otherwise have considered. Second, however fair
the ultimate resolution, the edict solution would have deprived students of a
vehicle for expressing their collective anger about the injustice they had
suffered and would have resulted in a series of individual visits both to the
professor and to the dean's office complaining about the nature of the choices
available. Another alternative, and the one I chose, was to hold a structured
meeting with all interested students, placing alternatives before the students but
expressing openness to student proposals. This alternative provided students
with an opportunity to vent and to participate in the process of selecting an
appropriate remedy.
The meeting was clearly an invitation for students to engage in rent-seeking
behavior. Nevertheless, student participation in developing a solution to
unusual problems like these has several advantages. First, encouraging rentseeking in a group meeting undoubtedly reduces the numbers of students who
will express their outrage and offer their proposed solutions in private meetings
with faculty and administrators. On the whole, then, less time may be devoted
to resolving the problem. Second, a group setting is less conducive to rentseeking because whatever benefits may be derived from successful rentseeking will be shared among a large number of recipients, thus reducing the
differential advantage to any individual rent-seeker. 51 This causes individuals
to think twice about pursuing purely personal goals, especially ones that
disadvantage others.
Perhaps most importantly, when students offer proposals in a group setting,
each student is more likely to recognize that his preferred solution may be
unacceptable to other students. For instance, raising the grades of all students

51 Cf Buchanan, supra note I, at 11-12 (arguing that if the differential advantages
granted to persons as a result of a government allocation are eliminated, it becomes
irrational for any persons to engage in rent-seeking); see RICHARD EPSTEIN, TAKINGS 208-09
( 1985) (discussing the advantages of a system in which any individual actor may only
demand additional benefits ifhe tenders them to others as well).
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who took the tainted exam would have been unacceptable to students in other
Torts classes whose class rank might be adversely affected by such a solution.
When students see, in an open forum, the various positions advanced by their
peers, they are less likely to press extreme positions both because they may
better see other perspectives on the issue and because they understand that the
law school administration is unlikely to adopt a position strongly opposed by
other affected students. 52 As a result, the quality of the suggestions generated
at such a session is likely to be higher than when a single student privately
seeks a benefit from a single administrator or faculty member. Moreover, open
discussion among students with differing points of view may increase the
likelihood that students will accept a compromise solution. 53
The basic point is this: not all participation in governance matters is rentseeking. When an unforeseen event at the institution creates a general sense of
injustice, some resolutions of the problem do more than distribute rents among
students. Although it is unrealistic to assume that students as a group can be
dissuaded from engaging in rent-seeking behavior, some students will strive to
reach solutions that improve the general morale of the student body. The
challenge for the law school administration is to channel rent-seeking behavior
in ways that give students a role in remedying the injustice, thus blunting
hostility toward the institution, and generating better information in the
process.

B.

Faculty Rent-Seeking

The faculty plays a critical role in the quality of any law school. First,
faculty scholarship enhances law school prestige, which in tum aids the law
school in recruiting both good students and strong faculty. Second, highquality teaching has an obvious impact on alumni support, but also on
admissions, through word-of-mouth. As a result, every law school has an
interest in promoting high-quality research and teaching and in retaining
faculty who are strong scholars and teachers. Because of the important role
faculty scholarship plays in evaluating the quality of a law school, a law school
dean would ordinarily want to allocate scarce resources in ways that promote
52

See Sunstein, supra note 50, at 1549 (arguing that self-interested positions "should be
revisable in light of collective discussion and debate, bringing to bear alternative
perspectives and additional information"); see also Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican
Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1512, 1529 (The civic
republican position is that "the deliberative process, if properly structured, will
transform ... values and ultimately reveal commonalities shared by different citizens. It is
this transformative power of politics that enables the polity to reach consensus about the
common good.").
53 There is, however, one significant countervailing cost. An open forum may lead some
people to attend a meeting to protect their perceived interests even if they would ordinarily
trust the law school administration to safeguard their interests. These students-who might
be among the most diligent-would rather study than lobby unless the prospect of deal
making leads them to fear that their interests will be ignored.
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faculty scholarship. Among the benefits that are generally attractive to faculty
are salary, research stipends, and reduced teaching loads. Each law school
must determine how to allocate those benefits. In each case, a variety of
allocation mechanisms are available.
1.

Faculty Salaries and the Role of Markets

Faculty salaries-the most significant benefit received by most faculty
members--could be set mechanically or the dean could retain discretion to set
salaries. The advantage of a mechanical formula, such as one that sets salaries
by some combination of years out of law school, years in teaching, and number
of advanced degrees, is obvious: the formula leaves little room for lobbying by
individual faculty members. The disadvantage, however, is equally obvious:
the law school that sets salaries without regard to market value risks losing its
most marketable (presumably its most productive) faculty members.
For many faculty members, a high percentage of salary is economic rent;
tenure protects them in their current jobs, but, because they have few prospects
of comparably attractive employment, they would not leave their current
schools even if their salaries were cut drastically. 54 For other faculty members,
however, very little of their salary is economic rent; because they have other
opportunities, their salary reflects market value not economic rents. The
reason these faculty members have other opportunities is that law schools
recognize that institutional reputation and the ability to attract students depends
in part on the reputation of the law school's faculty, both as scholars and as
teachers. A law school that loses its strongest faculty members risks a loss in
reputation. As a result, any law school dean will want the flexibility to meet
market competition for the school's strongest faculty members.55
Once a dean asserts the discretion to meet the market, however, any lockstep salary system collapses. If the dean announced that he would depart from
the lock-step system only for faculty members with other offers, the system
would encourage other faculty members to waste time soliciting offers they
have no intention of taking. 56 This cost to the law school would probably
exceed the cost generated by a system that gives the dean discretion over
salary, and therefore permits lobbying by individual faculty members. Market
forces, then, lead to a system that gives the dean discretion over salaries.

54 See Geoffrey Brennan & Robert D. Tollison, Rent Seeking in Academia, in TOWARD A
THEORY OF THE RENT-SEEKING SOCIETY, supra note I, at 344, 345-50 (arguing that the costs
associated with changing teaching positions and the fact that geographical preference often
plays a role in a teacher taking a university position deters professors from leaving their
current positions).
55 See id. at 351 (arguing that a dean or other academic decisionmaker may "rationally
seek to maximize the prestige of his department, because this in tum maximizes his own
market value and his bargaining position in relation to his own salary")
56 See id. at 353 (discussing the costs to faculty members and schools of searching out
offers to encourage an active bidding process for academics).
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Other Faculty Benefits

If market forces make discretion preferable with respect to faculty salaries,
the question is whether those same forces require discretion with respect to
other benefits. If discretion over salary is sufficient to permit the dean to
account for market forces, limiting discretion in other areas diminishes the
opportunity for rent-seeking. For instance, if salaries and research stipends
were both discretionary, the dean would face two pressure points for lobbying
efforts rather than one. In most circumstances, discretion in salaries should be
sufficient to meet market forces; from the individual faculty member's
perspective, the dean's offer of an additional dollar is at least as attractive if it
comes in salary as if it comes in research money. Similarly, with teaching
loads, the school could set a fixed price at which faculty members might buy
their way out of some of their teaching obligations. Then, giving the dean
salary discretion would be sufficient to meet reduced-load offers from other
institutions.
At that point, the question becomes whether a discretionary decision-making
process generates information in a way that improves the quality of decisions
or creates useful incentives for faculty members who are not candidates for
departure to other institutions.

a. Research Stipends
Many law schools award summer research stipends to faculty members.
The theory behind the research stipend is that faculty will be more productive
if rewarded for devoting summers to research rather than to extended vacation
or to consulting of some sort. In theory, then, research stipends are not
economic rents; they are payments to induce faculty members to engage in
work that is valuable to the institution.
In practice, however, research stipends do create economic rents for many
faculty members because those faculty members would engage in research and
publication whether or not stipends were made available. For these faculty
members, love of scholarship or professional prestige provides adequate
incentive for publication. Payments made to them for activities they would
pursue in any event constitute economic rents.
If the law school's objective were to maximize productivity, the law school
might concentrate on awarding stipends to those faculty who would produce
scholarship if awarded stipends but not otherwise. Such a system, however,
would entail significant cost. First, the system might cause demoralization of
the institution's most productive faculty members. 57 In addition, it would not
be easy to sort those for whom stipends provide a necessary incentive from
those for whom stipends constitute rent. Moreover, if it became clear that the
law school sorted on that basis, the school would create an incentive for all
faculty to disguise their inclination to write i.n order to qualify for stipends,
57 Ultimately, unless these productive faculty members were compensated in some other
way, as through salary, their demoralization might encourage them to leave the institution.

2003]

RENT-SEEKING IN LAW SCHOOLS

1167

making the sorting process even more difficult.
In light of these difficulties, the emphasis of any allocation process will be
on rewarding productive faculty members without assessing whether they
would write without stipends. The result, however, is that many of the stipend
payments will constitute economic rent. How, then, should these payments be
allocated?
One approach is for the dean to solicit research proposals from interested
faculty members. The dean, or a faculty committee, then evaluates the
proposals to decide which merit financial assistance. This system creates
significant incentive for rent-seeking by faculty members. First, faculty
members may devote inordinate time to developing rese~rch proposals rather
than to completing the research itself. Especially if the proposals are solicited
well before the time for which the stipend is awarded, the faculty members'
plans may change, making time spent on the proposal largely useless. Second,
the dean or the committee must read and evaluate the proposals, and, if a
committee is involved, debate their relative merits. Third, faculty members
may lobby with the committee or the dean on behalf of their proposals, and,
after decisions are made, the committee or the dean will have to explain their
decisions to disappointed faculty members.
By contrast, the school could allocate stipends to faculty who meet
predetermined mechanical criteria. For instance, stipends could be awarded to
all faculty who have published at least one law review article within the
preceding two years or one book within the preceding four years. This system
is a less costly way of allocating stipends if we regard them as rents. At the
same time, this method provides appropriate incentives to faculty members
who might be induced into greater productivity: continued eligibility depends
on continued productivity. The criteria could be made more stringent or more
lenient or simply different, depending on the institution's aspirations. The
mechanical system, as we have seen in other contexts, involves a smaller
expenditure of faculty and administrative time.
One might object that the mechanical system places no premium on high
quality scholarship. If stipends are simply economic rents, it is not clear why,
from the institution's standpoint, the quality of the work should matter. Even
ifwe assume more realistically that stipends do have some incentive effect, the
objection ignores two facts. First, a mechanical system could be designed to
reward quality, at least as measured by external criteria; that is, the stipend
could be enhanced for faculty who have book contracts with top university
presses or articles published at top law reviews. Second, if the goal of the
stipends is to generate more faculty productivity, the goal might be better
achieved by inducing weaker or more reluctant scholars to devote more effort
to scholarship rather than by focusing heavily on those whose prior success
predicts that they will continue to generate high quality work even without
additional incentives.
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Reduced Teaching Loads

Faculty members in the midst of a major research project often find it
helpful to have a reduced teaching load during a semester of unusually
intensive work. Unless pressing institutional needs conflict with the faculty
member's preferences, most law faculties and most deans would want to
accommodate an effort likely to result in significant scholarship. The question
is how to do so. 58
One alternative is to allocate reduced loads to faculty members who request
them whenever the dean or a faculty committee is convinced of the merit of the
faculty member's request. Such a system, however, places a premium on
lobbying. Those faculty members willing to bend the dean's ear obtain
benefits not available to those who don't ask for them. That system, in tum,
encourages more faculty members to bend the dean's ear when they could be
reading, writing, answering student questions, or engaging in other productive
activities.
An alternative approach is to create a "credit bank." If the ordinary teaching
load at the institution is eleven credits per year, a faculty member who prefers
to teach only eight credits in a particular year can earn the right to do so by
teaching fourteen the previous year or twelve for each of the three preceding
years. In this way, faculty members earn a reduced teaching load as a matter
of "right" rather than by lobbying for the reduced load as a matter of grace.
Rent-seeking would bring a faculty member no rewards.
Moreover, the teaching load need not be identical for all faculty members.
That is, faculty members who meet a pre-determined publication requirement
could be allocated a smaller load than those who do not meet that requirement.
This system also allocates reduced loads a matter of right and reduces the
incentive to engage in rent-seeking behavior.

III. THE EDUCATIONAL VALUE OF RENT-SEEKING
In many educational institutions, rent-seeking skills are of little value to
students. Few architects, physicians, or engineers will derive any professional
advantage from a finely-honed ability to seek economic rents. But law schools
train law students to practice law. Rent-seeking is the bread and butter of
many areas of legal practice. Litigation, negotiation, and lobbying-activities
central to the practice of law-require expertise at extracting economic rents.
Is it misguided, then, to discourage rent-seeking, particularly among law
students? Rather than treating rent-seeking as an evil that distracts students
from their studies, should we treat rent-seeking as an occasion for education
consistent with the mission of the law school?
One of my colleagues organized his course on this premise. The class ~as
58 The assumption here is that the institution's teaching needs generally require faculty to
teach a full load, and that the dean cannot simply permit anyone engaged in research to
teach less or not at all. Hence, any reduction in teaching load for one faculty member
requires someone else to pick up the slack.
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limited to 24 students. Under the law school's rules, classes of 25 students or
more are subject to a mandatory grading curve. More than 25 students came to
the first scheduled class. My colleague focused class discussion on a number
of issues: should the limit on class size be removed to permit the extra students
to take the class; should the students lobby with the Associate Dean for an
exemption from the mandatory curve; should some students volunteer to drop
out of the class as a formal matter and substitute an independent study, thus
keeping the class size below 25 (as far as the Registrar would know), while
permitting all interested students to remain in the class?
When I learned of this classroom exercise, my first reaction was anger. My
colleague was wasting his students' time-and mine- in what would be a
fruitless effort to evade rules adopted by the faculty. On reflection, however, I
recognized that the rent-seeking enterprise, while bad for the Associate Dean,
was of considerable value to students who were honing skills that would be of
value to them throughout their legal careers. In the course of lobbying with
me, students would learn how to make an argument and, in light of my
responses, how to sharpen that argument. They would also learn the
importance of tailoring their arguments to the decisionmaker involved. These
skills, while of marginal importance to a future engineer or musician, are
central to the success of a future lawyer.
This insight, however, did not convince me that law school administrators
should abandon rules for discretion in order to increase opportunities for
education through rent-seeking. Students learn as much or more through
unsuccessful rent-seeking as they would if the rent-seeking were successful.
To the extent that my colleague's enterprise could be treated as a clinical
offering in supervised rent-seeking, students receive the same hands-on
training if they fail as if they succeed.
Retaining mechanical rules has another advantage. In the outside world,
lawyers engage in rent-seeking in a variety of legal environments. The
strategies most likely to be successful when lawyers appeal to decisionmakers
constrained by rules are different from those that would be optimal with
decisionmakers who enjoy broad discretion. In an environment heavily shaped
by rules, lawyers must focus their arguments more sharply. They are not
finished when they convince the decisionmaker of the rightness of their
position; they must also provide the decisionmaker a "road map" through the
constraints the decisionmaker faces. Many decisionmakers-in particular,
low-level administrative agency decisionmakers--operate in a rule-bound
environment. Courts, especially inferior courts, also operate under significant
constraints. If rent-seeking in law school is treated as training for the
profession, the training will be better if the student learns to tailor her
argument to the constraints faced by the decisionmaker.
Of course, if law students face a regime of mechanical rules, some of them
will choose not to rent-seek at all. But that too is a learning experience,
perhaps the most valuable one. Lawyers must know how to evaluate when
rent-seeking is likely to be successful (and when it is not) so they can advise
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clients whether the rent-seeking enterprise is worth the necessary expenditure
of resources. And, given the few opportunity costs facing most law students
who consider rent-seeking on their own behalf, it is hardly likely that they will
err on the side of abandoning an enterprise that has little expected yield.
Finally, even if a regime that encourages student rent-seeking effectively
trains law students, the training is not cost-effective. The training tends to be
one-on-one; a single student-and no one else-learns from each encounter
with a law school administrator. Too many such encounters would require
employment of additional law school administrators, and it is unlikely that
such expenditure would be preferable from an educational standpoint to hiring
additional faculty members who might provide equivalent (or, more likely,
better) training in a classroom or clinical setting.
CONCLUSION

This essay is not intended as a blueprint for the eradication of rent-seeking
behavior in law schools. Indeed, because the opportunity costs facing student
rent-seekers is often so low, rent-seeking will always be with us.
My objectives have been more modest. First, I have vented my personal
frustrations at the hours I have spent dealing with rent-seekers, hours that could
have been better spent dealing with more pressing student and faculty
concerns. Second, I have distinguished those student and faculty lobbying
efforts that are likely to produce information useful in improving the quality of
law school decisions from those efforts unlikely to generate useful information.
Many of these opportunities for rent-seeking had not been evident to me as a
faculty member. Third, I have demonstrated that the policies a law school
adopts can have an impact, albeit at the margins, on the frequency and duration
of rent-seeking activity. Finally, I have explained why rules designed to
control rent-seeking behavior may have a positive impact even on the
education of future rent-seekers.

